


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 24, 2010



Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, consistent with section 4 of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-172), the enclosed strategic plan entitled, "Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord's Resistance Army."

The strategy guides U.S. support across the region to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). It has four objectives that support regional and multilateral efforts: (a) increase protection of civilians; (b) apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders; (c) promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and (d) increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities.

The strategy identifies priority actions related to protecting civilians and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA. It also provides a framework for the coordination of U.S. efforts and a description of broader efforts in the region. Given the necessity of bringing political, economic, military, and intelligence support to bear in addressing the threat posed by the LRA, the development of the strategy relied on the significant involvement of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Intelligence Community. All will remain engaged throughout implementation.

My Administration looks forward to working closely with the Congress on this important issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Howard L. Berman
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

STRATEGY TO SUPPORT THE DISARMAMENT OF THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

*A strategy to guide United States support across
the region for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and
eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability
posed by the Lord's Resistance Army*

Table of Contents

- I. Executive Summary 1
- II. Introduction..... 3
 - A. Background & Context 3
 - B. LRA-affected Areas 4
 - C. U.S. Response 5
 - D. Congressional Support..... 7
- III. U.S. Policy 7
- IV. U.S. Strategic Objectives 8
 - A. Desired End-State 8
 - B. Assumptions..... 9
 - C. Strategic Objectives to Guide United States Government Actions 10
 - 1. Increase protection of civilians 10
 - 2. Apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders. 12
 - 3. Promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters..... 14
 - 4. Increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities 17
- V. Implementation Priorities..... 20
 - A. U.S. bilateral, regional and multilateral engagement and partnerships 20
 - B. Relationship to Existing Strategies and Ongoing Efforts 21
 - C. Priority actions in LRA-affected areas 23
 - D. U.S. Interagency Coordination 24
- VI. Conclusion 24
- VII. Annexes..... 25
 - A. Public Law 111–172 (May 24, 2010): Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 26
 - B. Comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda 27
 - C. Acronyms..... 33

The legislation crystallizes the commitment of the United States to help bring an end to the brutality and destruction that have been a hallmark of the LRA across several countries for two decades, and to pursue a future of greater security and hope for the people of central Africa... *I signed this bill today recognizing that we must all renew our commitments and strengthen our capabilities to protect and assist civilians caught in the LRA's wake, to receive those that surrender, and to support efforts to bring the LRA leadership to justice.*

- Statement by the President on the signing of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (May 24, 2010)

I. Executive Summary

This document reflects a strategy and framework for guiding U.S. support to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The strategy outlines cross-cutting actions in support of four strategic objectives: (a) the increased protection of civilians; (b) the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders from the battlefield; (c) the promotion of defections from the LRA and support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of remaining LRA fighters; and (d) the provision of continued humanitarian relief to affected communities. This document also provides a description for reporting on U.S. assistance in support of efforts of the Government of Uganda and civil society to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda.

The LRA is one of the most brutal armed groups in Africa. Led by Joseph Kony since the late 1980s, the LRA survives by massacring civilians, looting their villages, and abducting boys and girls as well as men and women, to serve as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. Since the Ugandan army launched Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT) in December 2008, groups of LRA fighters have scattered across central Africa. While Ugandan operations against the LRA have reduced the ranks of fighters and removed from the battlefield several senior commanders, smaller groups of fighters have retained their motivation and capacity to inflict great harm on civilian populations, as demonstrated by several reported atrocities. Joseph Kony and the top leadership of the LRA leadership have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. They remain at large.

On May 24, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–172). Public Law 111–172 calls on the United States to develop a strategy to “mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability” posed by the LRA, and reiterated U.S. policy to provide “political, economic, military, and intelligence support” for viable multilateral efforts to

apprehend the group's leaders or remove them from the battlefield, to provide humanitarian assistance, and to promote justice and reconciliation in LRA-affected areas.

The policy of the United States is to work with national governments in the region and regional organizations toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict that has affected northern Uganda, as well as southern Sudan, and more recently areas of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In support of this policy, the implementation of the strategy will focus on (a) identifying the resources devoted to this effort; (b) increasing engagement with regional and multilateral partners to respond to the LRA; (c) providing clear links to broader regional strategies and priorities; and (d) achieving greater effectiveness and cross-cutting efforts at multiple levels. The extent to which the United States is able to engage in the full range of objectives described in the strategy is dependent on the availability of resources. The United States will also work with the international community to expand and synchronize available resources. Uganda has been the mainstay of efforts to counter the LRA and there is no guarantee that UPDF operations will continue indefinitely, given competing security priorities and the great distances from Uganda of LRA combatants. A key part of this strategy is to work with all regional and international partners to develop broad support and capacity for counter LRA actions.

The implementation of the strategy requires effective interagency collaboration. The development of the strategy relied on the significant involvement of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Intelligence Community. These departments and agencies are integral to the implementation of the strategy. Continued U.S. engagement with multilateral and regional partners, including affected countries and the African Union, the United Nations, as well as with the nongovernmental partners in the region and in the United States who have been at the forefront of efforts to increase awareness about the LRA and address its impact on the ground, will be critical.

The focus of the strategy is on simultaneously supporting regional and multilateral partners to maintain pressure on the LRA, both militarily and diplomatically; increasing options for LRA fighters and associated persons to leave the battlefield safely; and seeking to increase the protection of civilians. Specifically, the urgent challenges of apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior commanders from the battlefield, including support for sustained military and diplomatic pressure, must be matched with efforts to increase options for combatants, associated persons, and other abductees to safely leave the ranks of the LRA – whether through defection, escape or rescue – and transitioning through DDR. The strategy will also seek to reduce the vulnerabilities of civilian populations and to increase their access to humanitarian assistance where needed. The multi-year strategy provides an overarching plan for consistent action along these lines of effort. Recognizing that the LRA presents a unique and changing threat, the specific actions implemented under the strategy may need to respond flexibly. Though the challenge is complex, the vision remains simple: people in central Africa are free from the threat of LRA violence and have the freedom to pursue their livelihoods.

II. Introduction

A. Background & Context

The LRA has plagued central Africa, particularly northern Uganda, for more than 2 decades. Although the LRA is now comprised of only several hundred militia members using small arms, its tactics ensure that it remains a dangerous force in the region. The LRA tends to avoid direct confrontations with military forces – including the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) – and, at present, appears to sustain itself by attacking and pillaging villages in remote, rural areas of the eastern CAR, eastern DRC, and southern Sudan.

When attacking civilians, the LRA instills fear by conducting brutal executions. Civilians, including women and children, are abducted to serve as porters, sex slaves, and fighters. Abductees often remain with the LRA due to psychological manipulation. Those caught trying to escape from the LRA are frequently summarily executed. In contrast to many other armed groups which occasionally adopt such brutal tactics, the LRA has conducted such atrocities on a systematic and prolonged basis.

In December 2003, the Government of Uganda referred the “situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army” to the International Criminal Court (ICC). In October 2005, the ICC unsealed arrest warrants for Kony and four LRA commanders, accusing them of establishing “a pattern of brutalization of civilians,” including murder, forced abduction, sexual enslavement, and mutilation, amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes. In June 2006, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) issued Red Notices for the arrest of the five LRA commanders named in the ICC arrest warrants in support of the ICC. None of the suspects are in custody; at least two have reportedly been killed since the warrants were issued, leaving Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.

Beginning in July 2006, Uganda and the LRA initiated peace talks in Juba, southern Sudan with the mediation of the Government of Southern Sudan and international support. Although the so-called “Juba process” led to a potential peace agreement that the Government of Uganda endorsed, Joseph Kony and other LRA leaders were frequently disengaged from the negotiations and never came forward to finalize the deal. After repeated extensions to the signing deadline and continued failure of the LRA leadership to engage, the Juba process broke down in 2008.

In response, in December 2008, the UPDF launched OLT to attack LRA bases in the Garamba National Park in northeastern DRC, to which the LRA had moved between 2005 and early 2006. However, the top LRA leadership survived this initial attack and LRA fighters separated into small groups that fled Garamba. As of 2010, nearly 2 years later, the UPDF-led pursuit of the LRA continues (though at varying levels of effort) and the LRA’s area of operations has extended deeper into the CAR, eastern DRC, and southern Sudan. The region in which the LRA operates is roughly equivalent in size to the state of California.

As a result of OLT, the LRA has fractured and dispersed, and several LRA commanders have been killed or have defected. At present, numerous unofficial reports estimate that the overall strength of the LRA is only 200-300 combatants in addition to a number of associated persons,

including family members, non-combatants, and abductees. Most of those in the lower ranks of the LRA are believed to be abductees.

Although the LRA's ranks and organization have been diminished under the military pressure that kept it on the run, the group remains capable of inflicting human suffering and a sense of fear among vulnerable populations. Furthermore, as it has in the past, the LRA could regroup and increase its capacity, especially if it receives any significant outside support. Although the LRA has come under sustained military pressure, its leaders have reportedly been able to maintain some strategic planning capability as demonstrated by the survival of Joseph Kony and several other senior commanders. However, since the LRA has dispersed and has no single base of operations, communications between LRA leaders are considered to be limited. In this context, the current command-and-control structure of the LRA is hard to describe using a traditional line-and-block chart. Unconfirmed reports suggest that core groups of the LRA could be led by any combination of key figures, including Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.

The UPDF has been the primary national force actively pursuing the LRA. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) are all engaged at some level, but have competing priorities (particularly in the case of the SPLA) or limited capabilities (particularly in the case of the FARDC and FACA). There are also scattered self-defense groups in the region as well as a variety of other armed actors.

The LRA activity is located on the margins of the areas of operations of several different U.N. peacekeeping missions: the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the U.N.-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Of these missions, MONUSCO remains the most engaged.

B. LRA-affected Areas

Consistent with Public Law 111-172, the term "LRA-affected areas" refers to those portions of northern Uganda, southern Sudan, northeastern DRC, and southeastern Central African Republic determined by the Secretary of State to be affected by the Lord's Resistance Army as of the date of the enactment of this Act. The threat posed by the LRA and its movements, however, remain dynamic.


Historically, the LRA concentrated its presence and attacks in northern Uganda while at times maintaining rear-bases in southern Sudan, particularly in the districts of Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum, Pader, Lamwo, Lira, and surrounding locales. Attacks also took place in southern Sudan. In 2003, former U.N. Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland dubbed the LRA-affected part of northern Uganda "the world's worst forgotten humanitarian crisis." Between 2005 and 2006, following nearly 2 decades of conflict between the LRA and Government of Uganda, the LRA, including Kony and his senior commanders, began relocating from northern Uganda. By 2006, which also coincided with the peace talks in Juba, which lasted approximately 2 years, the security situation in northern Uganda stabilized, and humanitarian indicators began to improve.

As of late 2010, the vast majority of the 1.8 million former internally-displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their homes or locations near their home areas.

More recently the LRA has moved to remote areas of eastern CAR, northern DRC, and southern Sudan

C. U.S. Response

The United States has worked actively on multiple fronts over many years toward a lasting resolution to the threat posed by the LRA and its impact, first in northern Uganda, and then in the CAR, the DRC, and southern Sudan. The United States has supported humanitarian assistance in LRA-affected areas; promoted peace and reconciliation initiatives; and invested in recovery and transition efforts in northern Uganda. After multi-year diplomatic efforts to reach a peace deal failed in 2008, the United States began supporting regional military efforts. U.S. missions in the region have consistently engaged governments to facilitate the multi-tiered approach to mitigating and ending the LRA threat, while senior U.S. officials pursued diplomatic efforts with a wide range of international partners to address persistent challenges related to the LRA.



U.S. support and that of others to peacekeeping missions in the region has contributed to these organizations' efforts in the protection of civilians from the depredations of the LRA. As of November 2010, the United States has provided more than \$23 million to the UPDF for OLT, largely in the form of logistical (airlift, fuel, and trucks) and intelligence support, since December 2008. The Department of State designated Joseph Kony as "a Specially Designated Global Terrorist" under Executive Order 13224 on August 28, 2008. The LRA is also on the Terrorist Exclusion List.

The United States Government has provided humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected populations since the late 1980s and remains committed to addressing emergency needs throughout affected areas of the DRC, the CAR, and Sudan. In 2006, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) opened a temporary office in Gulu to oversee its humanitarian efforts in northern Uganda. One year later USAID officially established and opened the office. Since 2008, the United States Government has continued to provide food and support to IDPs in northern Uganda, while shifting emergency assistance to the DRC, Sudan, and more recently the CAR in response to the presence of LRA groups. In FY 2010, the United States Government provided more than \$34 million in humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected populations in the CAR, the DRC, and southern Sudan, and additional countrywide relief programs also benefit these vulnerable populations. United States Government humanitarian programs address the needs of IDPs, refugees, host populations, and communities whose livelihoods are negatively impacted by the LRA presence. This assistance includes more than \$25 million in emergency food distributions and \$8 million in agriculture and food security, health, protection, water, sanitation, and hygiene activities, as well as the distribution of emergency relief commodities.

In northern Uganda, the United States Government provided a total of \$168 million in assistance in FY 2010, focusing primarily on transitional and longer-term development programs. Approximately \$31 million has been provided in continued food assistance and early recovery support in areas recovering from years of LRA presence. In FY 2009, the United States Government provided \$165 million. Specifically, given the increased security in northern Uganda, USAID launched a 3-year \$21.8 million program in June 2008, known as the Northern Uganda Transition Initiative (NUTI), to promote peace, recovery, and development in the region and support the voluntary return of displaced citizens in northern Uganda. The program resulted in the total allocation of more than 200 grants to local government and community-based organizations, benefitting more than 150,000 people. In addition, in February 2008, USAID funded a \$9.5 million 3-year program focused on Stability, Peace, and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda (SPRING). The program aims to address the causes and consequences of the conflict in northern Uganda by implementing activities in peacebuilding and reconciliation; economic security and social inclusion; and access to justice. Both programs have targeted areas in northern Uganda most affected by the LRA.

In 2009, USAID launched the 3-year Northern Uganda Development of Enhanced Local Governance, Infrastructure, and Livelihoods (NUDEIL) program in Gulu, Amuru, Oyam, and Kitgum districts. NUDEIL aims to stimulate the economy and create sustainable peace in northern Uganda by increasing government services and generating income-producing opportunities to populations in areas of high return from internally displaced person camps. The

program also works to build the foundation for longer-term development in target districts. Of the \$37 million in funding for NUDEIL, \$30 million is provided to the Government of Uganda through non-project assistance and \$7 million funds a USAID-managed support contractor. The NUDEIL program provides technical support to district governments in the areas of engineering, financial management, and public outreach along with small infrastructure activities that the districts implement.

D. Congressional Support

On May 24, 2010, the President signed the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–172). As demonstration of the extraordinary bipartisan cooperation on this issue, at the time of signing, the legislation had 64 total Senate co-sponsors and 201 total House co-sponsors, which made it the most widely cosponsored bill on sub-Saharan Africa in recent U.S. history. Senators Russell D. Feingold (D-WI) and Sam Brownback (R-KS) in the Senate and Representatives James P. McGovern (D-MA) and Edward R. Royce (R-CA) in the House introduced the legislation requiring an interagency strategy to assist regional governments in disarming the LRA, while ensuring the protection of civilians. Specifically, the law calls for the President to produce an interagency strategy “to guide future U.S. support across the region for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.” Public Law 111–172 also calls for the Secretary of State to provide a report to Congress 1 year after the enactment of this Act on what assistance has been provided to LRA-affected areas and northern Uganda.

Congress has consistently reiterated its interest in resolving the LRA issue. The Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–283) affirmed support and encouragement for efforts of the Government of Uganda and civil society to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda. Congressional resolutions have similarly reiterated Congressional interest, including Senate Resolution 366, 109th Congress, agreed to February 2, 2006, Senate Resolution 573, 109th Congress, agreed to September 19, 2006, Senate Concurrent Resolution 16, 110th Congress, agreed to in the Senate March 1, 2007, and House Concurrent Resolution 80, 110th Congress, agreed to in the House of Representatives June 18, 2007.

III. U.S. Policy

Strategic setting

While the LRA has been driven from northern Uganda, it remains a source of regional instability and a direct threat to the lives and livelihoods of civilians. The LRA operates across remote areas of the CAR, the DRC, and Sudan and continues to intentionally target civilians, committing mass killings, mutilating victims and abducting civilians, including women and children. Uganda has been the mainstay of efforts to counter the LRA and there is no guarantee that UPDF operations will continue indefinitely, given competing security priorities and the great distances from Uganda of LRA combatants. A key part of this strategy is to work with all regional and international partners to develop broad support and capacity for counter LRA action. Should the UPDF withdraw its support from this operation, this would be a major

setback and would require a significant build-up in other regional forces which might take several years.

The LRA issue interfaces with several foreign policy priorities of the United States in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States remains committed to working with the international community to support peace and stability in Sudan, Somalia, and the DRC. The United States also remains committed to further supporting the transition to peace and security in northern Uganda as well as national level efforts to strengthen governance, development, and human rights. The United States also supports and applauds Uganda's regional leadership and contributions to pursuing peace in Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

These foreign policy challenges overlap with the potential for the LRA to further destabilize critical and fragile areas in central Africa. Accelerating targeted efforts in response to the LRA could help end what has been a chronic regional problem that has remained unresolved far too long, despite significant attention and resources. U.S. efforts outlined in this strategy will advance the goal of eliminating the threat posed by the LRA, which in turn may positively impact other priorities in the region. Moreover, reinvigorating the commitment of the United States advances U.S. national interests by seeking to support peace and security for those terrorized by the LRA, and assists those who have been abducted to break free of the LRA.

Statement of Policy

The policy of the United States is to work with national governments and regional organizations in the area toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the LRA conflict by: (a) providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the LRA, to apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other top leaders, and to disarm and demobilize the remaining LRA fighters; (b) targeting assistance to respond to the humanitarian needs of populations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan currently affected by the activity of the LRA; and (c) further supporting efforts of the Government of Uganda and civil society to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda.

IV. U.S. Strategic Objectives

The vision for this strategy is that the people in central Africa are free from the threat of LRA violence and have the freedom to pursue their livelihoods. This section outlines the specific end-state and strategic outcomes and the strategic objectives for achieving them.

A. Desired End-State

The desired end-state is that there is no longer a threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the LRA. The specific strategic outcomes, which are consistent with the President's strategic direction and Public Law 111-172, follow:

Strategic outcomes

- Threat to civilians posed by the LRA is eliminated;
- Joseph Kony and senior commanders are apprehended or removed from the battlefield and brought to justice;
- Remaining LRA fighters are disarmed and demobilized;
- IDPs, refugees, former LRA combatants and associated persons are reintegrated in their home areas;
- Humanitarian requirements of affected populations are met; and
- LRA-affected communities are able resume livelihood activities

B. Assumptions

It is important to note that any U.S. strategy to mitigate and eliminate the LRA threat in central Africa presupposes several important assumptions.

- Any reduction in military or diplomatic pressure, or the provision of safe haven by any state or non-state actor, could enable the LRA to regroup and rebuild its forces.
- Any effective strategy cannot rely exclusively on one military force in LRA-affected areas (whether a national or peacekeeping force).
- Repositioning existing peacekeeping forces (if possible) within LRA-affected areas would come with significant tradeoffs, including humanitarian consequences, as a result of moving troops from other vulnerable areas.

In addition, the following considerations among others have been taken into account during the strategy process.

- There is no guarantee that Ugandan operations against the LRA will continue at the same pace as they have since OLT began in December 2008 given the great distance from Uganda and other Ugandan foreign policy priorities related to Somalia and Sudan.
- All regional militaries have competing national priorities. Even if issues of priority are addressed, other national forces generally have limited mobility, capabilities, and resources to respond or mitigate LRA attacks, pursue LRA units, and engage the LRA.
- The LRA has often responded to military pressure by retaliating against vulnerable communities.
- There is no purely military solution to the LRA threat and impact.
- Peacekeeping missions have mandates and priorities that reflect specific objectives to support a sustainable peace, including provision of assistance for security and humanitarian aims, for which they often have limited capabilities, and thus, modest resources to protect civilians and support efforts to confront the LRA.
- As the LRA often moves on the margins of the operational areas of different peacekeeping missions, there may be only a minimal peacekeeping presence in LRA-affected areas, if any.
- The extent of U.S. efforts set forth in this strategy remains a function of available and consistent resources.

C. Strategic Objectives to Guide United States Government Actions

The strategy prioritizes four primary objectives that will be pursued simultaneously in support of regional and multilateral efforts.

Strategic Objective 1: Increase protection of civilians

The protection of civilians is central to the strategy. This section describes the nature of the threat to civilians in LRA-affected areas; provides strategic and operational definitions of protection of civilians in the context of LRA-affected areas; and describes the specific objectives the United States will pursue in support of the protection of civilians and ensuring all actors involved do the same. While recognizing that the nature of the threat to civilians and vulnerabilities and capabilities at the community level may differ in different districts and countries, this section provides a general overview of the issues.

Problem Statement

The LRA remains a serious threat to civilian populations in the affected areas. Attacks by roving groups of LRA on civilian populations in three countries (the CAR, the DRC, and Sudan) continue to result in significant loss of life, injury, abduction, rape, sexual slavery, mutilation, and pillaging. Fear of LRA attack prevents freedom of movement, pursuit of livelihood activities, and access to services by civilians. In addition, many civilians threatened by the LRA are also threatened by various other conflict factors (mostly unrelated) in each of the three countries.

The lack of information on the location of LRA elements and the location and vulnerabilities of remote civilian populations impedes civilian protection efforts. A lack of communications infrastructure prevents timely transmission of warning messages to civilian populations or reports of LRA attacks for appropriate response.

The capabilities of national, regional, and multinational forces to provide protection against the LRA are limited. The regional nature of the LRA threat also presents political and logistical challenges in the cross-border coordination of protection actors. Furthermore, national forces responsible for protecting civilian populations have competing national or, in some cases, political priorities. UPDF efforts, for example, are focused largely on the task of pursuing LRA leaders, rather than the task of protecting civilian populations. However, the physical presence of the UPDF (whether by operational design or not) appears to make some nearby communities less vulnerable to LRA attack.

External actors such as the multilateral peacekeeping missions in the area face operational challenges. The U.N. peacekeeping missions in Chad/CAR (MINURCAT), the DRC (MONUSCO), and Sudan (UNMIS/UNAMID), have civilian protection in their mandates for their respective areas of responsibility, but at varying degrees have lacked effective mission-wide strategies on protection – this is a broader problem facing U.N. missions we are trying to address. These missions, which have faced major challenges from other armed groups (or in

some cases poorly disciplined national forces), operated alongside host government's whose own efforts did not address the threats to the civilian population effectively, and have had limited capacity, such as inadequate mobility, and serious competing priorities. The importance of the Sudan referenda in the region is one such competing priority shared by many in the region. The mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) is similarly limited. Moreover, MINURCAT, which only has 300 personnel in the CAR, will come to an end by December 31, 2010 and potentially leave a security void in the north.

Objectives

Given the strategy's goal of mitigating and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA, for the purposes of this strategy, the strategic definition of protection of civilians is that there is (a) freedom from imminent threat of physical violence or abduction and (b) freedom of movement to pursue livelihoods. Recognizing that the protection of civilians is a broad concept, for the purposes of this strategy the operational definition includes all efforts, whether civilian or military, that seek to improve the security and safety of civilians exposed to LRA violence. These efforts include actions to reduce the threat itself, to minimize civilian vulnerability to the threat, to reduce the frequency of their exposure to the threat, and to increase their ability to anticipate and react to the threat.

Civilian protection extends beyond the prevention or the response to violence or atrocities committed against civilians in the course of a conflict to also include ensuring that – to the extent possible – civilians have the means to protect themselves, including communication within and across communities as well as with security personnel and freedom of movement. The protection of civilians must necessarily encompass military and diplomatic components in addition to humanitarian and development assistance. To maximize protection, all these components must be aligned and working in concert. All agencies involved in the implementation of the strategy have a role to play in making sure that protection is integrated throughout. While the protection of civilians is an important organizing aim of the strategy, the specific tasks and appropriate roles in support of military or civilian actors will vary.

Recognizing the challenges posed above, the objectives below seek to enhance the environment through which civilians are better able to pursue their own protection strategies, while also continuing to enhance institutional response capacity. Cross-cutting attention should be given to considering potential for unintended consequences or increased risk for vulnerable populations in LRA-affected areas.

Objective 1.1: Improve sharing of information for understanding threats and vulnerabilities of civilian population as a result of LRA presence, and for supporting and developing effective protection strategies and interventions.

This objective requires actions at the regional, national, and local levels in order to increase access to all forms of improved communication systems and to increase the exchange of information across national borders and within and among affected communities. Actions under this objective are primarily for the immediate benefit of the community level and should aim to

expand the ability of communities to access and relay information and strengthen their own self-protection mechanisms, which is critical given the vast expanse of territory in which the LRA operates. For the purposes of this strategy, self-protection mechanisms refer, for example, to community level efforts that have sought to alert or provide early warning – this does not refer to armed self-defense groups. For protection, actors at the community level as well as the national and regional level, this objective will also seek to assist in identifying and addressing protection challenges, particularly at the local level, that are specific to LRA actions, as well as those stemming from other ongoing security threats. Local outreach is an important component of this objective as it is for other ones.

Objective 1.2: Promote the increase in the physical security of vulnerable civilian populations through the presence and action of protection actors.

For the purposes of this strategy, protection actors refer to local authorities, national governments and militaries, and multilateral peacekeeping missions. Through presence and action, local authorities, national governments and militaries, and multilateral peacekeeping missions, United States Government efforts under this objective will aim to improve the security of at-risk populations, including their ability to pursue livelihoods as well as prevention and protection from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Specifically, in the short-term, actions under this objective would include increased engagement and coordination with all relevant protection actors in order to increase presence in LRA-affected areas, enhance efforts to assist with protection, and (as possible and appropriate) to urge more robust regional coordination. In addition, while recognizing existing limitations of these actors, this objective seeks to enhance the capacity of multiple actors to better anticipate, deter or mitigate, degrade, impede and halt the threats from the LRA. For example, this would include identifying best methods to degrade LRA threat over specified periods of time.

Objective 1.3: Strengthen the understanding of the LRA threat and the will and capabilities of key actors to support efforts to protect civilians and prevent and mitigate LRA attacks.

Key governments and actors in the region (primarily those in LRA-affected areas, but also regional governments and donor states) may be well versed in the LRA issues and broader issues of regional security where the LRA operates. However, more can be done to adequately prioritize efforts to mitigate the LRA threat and to protect civilian populations. While recognizing competing priorities and limited capabilities, this objective requires actions to increase recognition of the issue and related ones among regional governments and international actors as well as to promote political will to appropriately address the challenge.

Strategic Objective 2: Apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders

The United States is working with the Government of Uganda and other governments in the region to bring the LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony and his top commanders, to justice. The United States has supported regional efforts to end the LRA threat. Maintaining such efforts to

bring LRA leadership to justice while ensuring the protection of civilian populations across this vast, remote area presents a particularly difficult and critical challenge.

While every effort should be made and opportunity taken to accelerate the apprehension or removal of Kony and the senior commanders, short-term actions must be considered within the context of a multi-year commitment that will maximize the chances of overall success. In addition, while military pressure remains important, simply strengthening and increasing military operations is insufficient. Any such efforts must be part of broader, cross-cutting and coordinated political, economic, military, and intelligence support.

Problem statement

The LRA is degraded but continues to abduct and train fighters and remains a major threat to civilian populations. The LRA has the potential to regroup and escalate its activity, especially if it receives any support from state or non-state actors in the region, whether in the form of material assistance or safe-haven. The LRA is broken up into small groups and spread across an enormous area in the northern DRC, the CAR, and Sudan. Much of the terrain is sparsely populated and covered in thick vegetation with few roads or means of communication, thereby enabling the LRA to evade capture.

Since the launch of Operation Lighting Thunder in December 2008, the UPDF, working in coordination with the militaries of the CAR, the DRC, and southern Sudan, has made gains against the LRA, but the splintering of the LRA has meant that smaller, highly mobile LRA units menace civilians across a wider territory. At present, numerous unofficial reports estimate that the overall strength of the LRA is only 200-300 combatants in addition to a number of associated persons, including family members, non-combatants, and abductees.

The UPDF has been the primary national force pursuing the LRA throughout the CAR, the DRC, and southern Sudan. Other regional militaries have limited capability to conduct counter-LRA operations. The SPLA, the FARDC, and the FACA have been engaged, but often have competing priorities (i.e., the SPLA) or limited capabilities (i.e., the FARDC and FACA). However, the sustained military and diplomatic cooperation of governments in the region to defeat Joseph Kony and the LRA, coupled with strong support from the international community, remains the most critical component for success.

To date, regional forces have been unable to apprehend or remove from the battlefield the top LRA leadership. However, the UPDF has removed from the battlefield several figures in the LRA, including Joseph Kony's Director of Operations Charles Arop, captured in November 2009, and acting guerilla commander Bok Abudema, killed in January 2010.

The ICC has outstanding arrest warrants for four senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Vincent Otti, the last of whom is believed to be dead. The United States has been and will continue to be supportive of the ICC cases against LRA leaders, as well as the current and possible future cases before the War Crimes Division in the Ugandan High Court or other national courts. Bringing these senior commanders to justice is a key component of creating a lasting peace in the region.

Objectives

The following objectives describe U.S. efforts in support of regional and multilateral partners to maintain military and diplomatic pressure on the LRA. An important component is the integrated logistical, operational, and intelligence assistance at multiple levels in order to increase the likelihood of success in apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and his key commanders. United States Government assistance will be provided in a manner that is consistent with U.S. and international law and with other U.S. efforts to support the further professionalization of the UPDF.

- Objective 2.1:** Provide enhanced integrated logistical, operational, and intelligence assistance in support of regional and multilateral partners.

The United States will seek to build the capacity of partners to effectively integrate and coordinate such support at multiple levels. Actions in accordance with this objective will optimize opportunities and quality of information sharing and subsequent responsible use of that information. Actions in accordance with this objective will also ensure that all the necessary precautions are made to mitigate unintended consequences of such support by focusing on the professionalization of forces and taking into account local level dynamics and the vulnerabilities of remote communities.

- Objective 2.2:** Enhance and sustain diplomatic efforts to coordinate and encourage support for multilateral and regional military forces in their efforts to counter the LRA and to deny any potential support to the LRA from outside actors.

Actions in accordance with this objective will seek to promote and expand multilateral and regional leadership coordination and support for efforts to apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and his senior commanders. Specifically, this includes efforts to increase regional capacity and effectiveness to responsibly and appropriately respond to such threats. Such efforts will entail close collaboration and coordination with U.N. peacekeeping missions. As part of this objective, the United States Government will also seek to maintain diplomatic consensus on the necessity of mitigating and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA and making sure that the LRA receives no support or safe-haven.

- Strategic Objective 3:** Promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters

In concert with sustained military and diplomatic pressure on the LRA, the United States will further explore opportunities and options for increased exit from the ranks of the LRA, including voluntary disarmament.

Problem Statement

Just as the LRA has sought to maintain or replenish its ranks through abductions, it has sought to keep those abducted, including children forced into service as fighters or wives, from fleeing. The LRA leadership has actively attempted to prevent defections among LRA fighters and associated persons. Specifically, LRA commanders kill those caught attempting to escape, destroy means of communication (radios), kill or maim civilians seen as assisting in defection efforts, and spread misinformation among fighters that they will be arrested or killed by state authorities upon defection. In addition, LRA fighters have presented themselves to civilian populations as defectors as a ploy before attacking. As a result, civilian populations in LRA-affected areas may attack or reject true defectors.

LRA fighters could be unwilling to defect from the group for a variety of factors including their commitment to the LRA's militant cause and way of life, the belief that they cannot return to a normal life after years of fighting, lack of knowledge of amnesty and transitional justice plans, and the fear that they will be killed by more senior LRA leaders for even considering dialogue or surrender.

Options for how and where LRA fighters can physically present themselves for demobilization are limited, and insecurity prevents access by outside actors. There is a general lack of mechanisms and implementing partners for DDR efforts in LRA-affected areas. There is also limited capacity and funding for reintegration programs in the CAR, the DRC and southern Sudan in support of DDR programs. The UPDF and MONUSCO – the primary actors in DDR related to the LRA – cannot reach LRA members beyond their current areas of operation. The limited United States Government presence in LRA-affected areas hampers U.S. support for more effectively enhancing the coordination, monitoring, and oversight of DDR efforts.

Objectives

To address this problem, United States Government efforts will seek to help generate enhanced exit options for LRA fighters and associated persons. Since the majority of LRA fighters, including children, and associated persons were abducted and forced to fight for the LRA in order to survive, actions under this objective will seek to encourage defections among these persons, increase opportunities for abductees to safely flee, and provide viable options for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Under this objective, necessary actions include support for designing and communicating exit options, providing additional and better coordinated reception opportunities to receive LRA defectors, and further investing in efforts to reintegrate former combatants. Regional and multilateral actors are already using leaflets and radio announcements, including interviews with demobilized LRA officers, to encourage defections. Such messages need to be increased and distributed more widely. Such messages should also use local languages and graphics that can be understood by ethnic groups throughout affected regions in Central Africa and those who cannot read.

Reintegration packages must be sufficient to incentivize defection and enhance the pull-factor for those combatants who have been fighting for most of their lives. Ultimately, actions under this objective will seek to support the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of LRA

fighters and associated persons into their home countries. The “associated persons” include non-combatants, including women and children, associated with the LRA who often require specialized reintegration assistance. Depending on the country of origin of former LRA combatants, this strategic objective would increase attention on DDR and related efforts in the CAR, the DRC, or southern Sudan as well as links with similar efforts in Uganda. Additional consideration will also be required for psycho-social rehabilitation of former combatants, including child soldiers.

Objective 3.1: Ensure continued multilateral support to efforts to promote defections of LRA fighters and non-combatants through radio programs, leaflets, and other communication.

United States Government efforts will seek to leverage actors already working to communicate accurate information on defection in the affected area, including via print and non-print media. Overarching actions taken to increase the flow of communication could also help to facilitate improved knowledge sharing directed at abductees and LRA combatants regarding DDR. Efforts to foster dialogue within communities could help to ensure the dissemination of accurate information rather than rumors and misinformation.

Objective 3.2: Work with regional governments, MONUSCO, and other international actors to ensure necessary facilities and procedures are in place to receive defectors and transport them to desired home locations.

The Government of Uganda has significant architecture in place to support defectors. Under this objective, the United States Government will work to spread lessons learned from Uganda to other affected countries in the region and support their implementation. This will help ensure a safe defection process, regardless of the defector’s country of origin. While the Government of Uganda provides the legal framework for amnesty and the actual process through the Amnesty Commission, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and civil society provide support to returnees from the LRA. We will also work closely with these actors and the U.N., IOM, and ICRC in order to promote a common system.

Objective 3.3: Support the provision of enhanced medical, social, and economic reintegration assistance to demobilized LRA members and receiving communities.

Lessons from DDR programs in other areas emphasize the need to support not only reintegrating individuals, but also the communities into which they are returning. United States Government efforts in line with this objective will seek not only to help meet the immediate needs of defectors and escapees, but also to prepare them and their communities for the next phase of their lives, to be directed towards peaceful and productive aims. Reintegration extends beyond short-term material and/or financial assistance and is a social and economic process with an open timeframe. A “community-focused reintegration” approach acknowledges the greater breadth of vulnerable, conflict-affected population groups and seeks to promote reintegration by creating a safe environment in which elements of divided communities can interact. Providing practical life skills and livelihood training is provided to both former combatants and community

members to foster cooperation and facilitate the reintegration of combatants within communities of origin or choice. In addition, the reintegration efforts will pay special attention to the issues of SGBV and unique needs of reintegrating children. As possible, this objective will also seek to address gaps in reintegration services in DRC, southern Sudan and especially CAR while recognizing the challenge of operating in remote areas.

Strategic Objective 4: Increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities

Problem Statement

Populations residing in LRA-affected areas are under constant threat of attack, frequently displaced, and unable to pursue normal livelihood activities. As a result, humanitarian needs exist in physical protection, accessing food and clean drinking water, education, health care, maintaining household income levels, nutrition, and psychosocial support. Moreover, insecurity and logistical constraints continue to impede humanitarian agencies from providing adequate humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected populations. LRA attacks and the lingering presence of combatants create humanitarian needs among the following three categories of beneficiaries: displaced populations, host communities, and households unable to pursue normal livelihood activities due to insecurity.

Insecurity remains the main obstacle to humanitarian assistance in LRA-affected areas of the CAR and the DRC. The United States, through the Department of State and USAID, remains prepared to respond as needed to coordinate internationally and address gaps in emergency relief services, pending improved security allowing for greater nongovernmental organizations and U.N. absorptive capacity. Access challenges, limited information, and sparse communication networks characterize LRA-affected areas across all three countries, and create further impediments to increased relief efforts. However, these factors are secondary to the larger security constraints. Improved access and communication options have the potential to benefit relief operations; however, any increase in overall coverage is likely to be marginal without a complementary improvement in security.

LRA violence limits humanitarian access, blocks vital trans-border routes, and obstructs agricultural production and livestock trade. Attacks have also debilitated social services and made it difficult to protect displaced and vulnerable people from threats such as killings, abductions, and SGBV. Education, health care, food production, infrastructure, local governance, and other sectors fundamental to development have seen significant setbacks due to the LRA attacks. Farmers' access to land is limited due to insecurity, and deteriorating road conditions further hamper market activity.

Humanitarian assistance priorities include the provision of emergency food assistance, relief commodities, primary health care services, psychosocial and protection programs, and emergency feeding programs where acute malnutrition is prevalent. Where security permits, livelihoods support activities, such as cash-for-work programs, are required to mitigate disruptions to livelihoods activities. Humanitarian protection and assistance are closely intertwined in the LRA context. In addition to the general threat of attack, the LRA's tendency

to prey on civilians for food and other resources means that aid recipients may face an increased risk of attack by the LRA. Specifically in the DRC, there is a risk that additional humanitarian inputs to LRA-affected areas without a change to the current security situation could increasingly make the beneficiaries into targets and detract from overarching United States Government civilian protection objectives.

Objectives

The ultimate goal of United States Government efforts under this objective is that populations in LRA-affected areas of the CAR, the DRC, and Sudan – and any other areas into which the LRA may expand its operations – will have returned to a state in which they are free to pursue economic livelihood activities free from attack. Communities will have resumed a forward path toward socioeconomic development. LRA-related emergency assistance will have ended, and early recovery programming will have been incorporated into existing country-level humanitarian assistance programs and development strategies.

To achieve that goal, the United States Government will continue to pursue efforts to enhance and facilitate the provision of emergency assistance (emergency relief commodities, emergency food assistance, psychosocial support, short-term livelihood assistance, safe drinking water, emergency health care) and where possible, support the increase in access, security and (transportation and communications) infrastructure for the delivery of these services.

Objective 4.1: Humanitarian agencies provide minimum standards of life-saving support to LRA-affected populations.

United States Government efforts will remain focused on Objective 4.1 while any of the following conditions prevail: LRA attacks continue, populations remain displaced, daily movement and humanitarian responses are curtailed by general insecurity or perceived threat of attack, or displaced and affected populations remain unable to pursue normal livelihood activities, increasing the need for humanitarian assistance.

In order to support and provide basic lifesaving support, United States Government humanitarian agencies will continue to assess the needs of LRA-affected populations and provide emergency assistance. The United States Government will seek to maintain adequate levels of funding to the U.N., nongovernmental organization, and other international organization. In addition, the United States Government will leverage its influence with implementing partners as necessary to focus humanitarian programming on LRA-related needs. The United States Government also advocates with donor counterparts to participate financially and diplomatically in addressing LRA-related humanitarian needs.

The United States Government adheres to the international “do no harm” principle that seeks to ensure that humanitarian assistance does not have unintended negative consequences or increase the risks to beneficiary populations. Relief organizations requesting United States Government funding are required to actively seek to mitigate risks associated with humanitarian activities. For example, United States Government humanitarian offices will coordinate with United States Government civilian protection efforts to ensure that all communication infrastructure

interventions involving national security forces, Peacekeeping Operations, and assistance actors uphold the “do no harm” principle. Similarly, as a condition of receiving OFDA funding, implementing partners must adopt a code of conduct that addresses the protection of beneficiaries from sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian relief operations. The code of conduct requirement is a tool for ensuring that United States assistance “does no harm” and is a vehicle for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and special consideration will be given to the needs of SGBV survivors.

Objective 4.2: Promote increased access and infrastructure for the delivery of humanitarian services.

The United States Government will also continue to help coordinate efforts by international humanitarian actors to facilitate humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected populations. The United States Government will continue to encourage the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to adopt a cross-border coordination mechanism to better link humanitarian actors and addressing LRA-affected areas. In order to identify and effectively address emergency needs, the United States Government will advocate for comprehensive needs assessments and mapping of emergency needs and ongoing response activities across all affected areas. The USG also will advocate for increased information-sharing among humanitarian actors present in LRA-affected areas and emphasize the need for the U.N. and relief agencies to engage and deploy senior staff to lead response efforts.

The United States Government also will continue to facilitate humanitarian assistance by supporting targeted transportation improvements that increase access for affected populations. The United States Government is exploring the utility of a combined international funding mechanism for transportation programs that address access to LRA-affected regions. The United States Government is also seeking to fund priority road and airstrip rehabilitation projects in LRA-affected areas, and is collaborating with the U.N. Logistics Cluster – particularly in DRC – to identify more flexible humanitarian air transport options.

Objective 4.3: Humanitarian agencies support early recovery activities, including transition support and livelihood support for LRA-affected populations.

United States Government efforts will focus on this objective when the following conditions are present: (a) LRA-related humanitarian needs have been met for the majority of the affected population; (b) regions formerly affected by LRA activities have been free from a minimum period of time or other appropriate benchmarks for security and stability have been met; (c) improved security has granted the general population greater freedom of movement and allowed displaced populations to return to areas of origin; and (d) populations have access to basic livelihood infrastructure, including markets and land.

If those conditions are present, the United States Government will seek to provide early recovery assistance to help restore communities emerging from a state of humanitarian crisis to return to pre-LRA levels of livelihood security. Livelihood programs target support for agriculture and food security, economic recovery and asset restoration, and market systems. Psychosocial

support continues for victims of LRA violence, returnees, communities receiving former combatants, and additional vulnerable populations.

V. Implementation Priorities

In support of the effective and efficient implementation of the policy and strategic objectives, this section describes: (a) bilateral, regional, and multilateral engagement and partnerships; (b) the link to other strategies; (c) priority actions and outcomes; and (d) coordination and reporting mechanisms.

A. U.S. bilateral, regional and multilateral engagement and partnerships

The United States will engage on a sustained basis with regional and multilateral actors in support of shared objectives and common challenges. Although the United States continues to provide ongoing assistance to address the LRA threat and its impact, those resources and efforts are limited and would benefit from viable external assistance and coordination. Regional and multilateral coordination is critical to address the scope of the LRA threat, which spans across borders. In implementing the strategy, we will seek to include regular engagement with national governments, the African Union (AU), United Nations, European Union (EU), nongovernmental organizations, and others, as appropriate. Specifically, the United States will prioritize the development of a common framework for action and a coordinated international response.

The purpose of the engagement is to maintain and, if and where necessary, increase the regional commitment to addressing the LRA issue. The United States will continue to work with other donor countries in support of counter-LRA, DDR, humanitarian and civilian protection efforts. While the strategic objectives describe the U.S. approach, the United States will continue to work with partners to develop a common framework of action, including funding. The United States also encourages continued high-level engagement by the African Union and relevant regional institutions, including through participation in subsequent AU ministerial sessions on the LRA.

Bilateral engagement

The Department of State will undertake regular bilateral engagement at multiple levels to further encourage or maintain active support for the objectives mentioned. Such engagement will take place with the national governments or other relevant actors in the LRA-affected countries as well as other states in the region and elsewhere, including traditional donor partners and others.

Regional engagement

The African Union has expressed grave concern over the continued threats posed by the LRA to security and the humanitarian situation in DRC, the CAR, and southern Sudan. In October 2010, the AU sponsored a conference in Bangui, the CAR, which the United States attended, to discuss the impact of the LRA and the way forward for the region and the international community. The United States applauds AU engagement and regional leadership and coordination to address the LRA threat. The AU engagement also provides a framework for the regular review of the status

and implementation of decisions at the conference related to military and security efforts; humanitarian, development and other related efforts; and international support and assistance.

This conference was a result of the earlier AU decision a few months earlier, in July 2010, to organize consultations among the countries affected by the activities of the LRA and other interested parties, with the view to facilitating a coordinated regional action in the face of the threat posed by this group. These recent events are consistent with previous AU actions. In 2009, the AU called upon the countries of the region “to renew their efforts, including military efforts, to neutralize the LRA and bring to an end its atrocities and destabilizing activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Southern Sudan and CAR.”

Multilateral engagement

The United States has worked with its U.N. Security Council partners to ensure U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region increase their cooperation, coordination, and information sharing, so to more effectively address the LRA threat. MONUSCO has deployed troops in some LRA-affected areas of the DRC to help protect civilians, which has had a deterrence effect and has helped increase humanitarian access. The United States will continue to work to ensure U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region are resourced appropriately to fulfill their mandates. We will encourage the newly created U.N. political office for Central Africa to use its good offices to strengthen regional cooperation and increase international cooperation to eliminate the LRA threat. The United States also supports the deployment of U.N. humanitarian staff to LRA-affected areas, where conditions permit.

Other multilateral organizations and groupings, such as the Office of the EU Special Representative and the World Bank’s Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) have taken steps to discuss and develop regional strategies to address the LRA and LRA-related issues and provide recommendations for action. Such multilateral engagement is important for developing a common framework for action and a coordinated international response. The Great Lakes Contact Group and World Bank TDRP-led Working Group on LRA are also important venues to coordinate strategy implementation and help shape a common framework of action with other participating countries and institutions.

Nongovernmental engagement

In addition, nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups, think tanks, and other institutions have played a critical role in framing the problem and raising international attention (including popular U.S. support for congressional action). These groups have also demonstrated specialized knowledge of the issues and have played a major role in the actual humanitarian and development response. Several of these groups and networks of groups have developed important analyses and expertise that have informed the strategy. The appropriate agencies will continue to engage such groups during the implementation of the strategy.

B. Relationship to Existing Strategies and Ongoing Efforts

The goals and objectives of this strategy are aligned with those of the United States in the region, particularly as they relate to DRC; Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and the AU.

National Security Strategy

This strategy is consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States (2010). Consistent with the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect,” the National Security Strategy recognizes that “those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held accountable.” This strategy supports the apprehension of those who have far too long intentionally targeted, mutilated, enslaved, abducted, and killed innocent civilians, including children.

Consistent with the National Security Strategy, this strategy relies on leveraging the capabilities across U.S. departments and agencies in order to work in partnership with multilateral and bilateral partners, particularly regional ones. In addition, the National Security Strategy recognizes that partnerships with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and community-based organizations are critical to U.S. success at home and abroad. The ideas, values, energy, and creativity of nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups, academic institutions, foundations, and community-based organizations provided significant contributions to the development of this strategy as well as Public Law 111–172. Upon the release of the strategy, the United States Government will continue to deepen its partnerships through enhanced opportunities for engagement, coordination, transparency, and information sharing.

Sudan

In Sudan, the United States is committed to working with the international community to support implementation of outstanding elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ensure that the referendum on the future of Southern Sudan in 2011 happens on time and that its results are respected. In addition, the United States will continue to engage in the efforts necessary to support peace and stability after the referendum, and continue to work to secure peace, dignity, and accountability in Darfur.

Uganda

In Uganda, the United States works to promote good governance and regional security by building the capacity of the Ugandan government to protect and respond to the needs of its citizens and of civil society to participate actively in government decision-making. U.S. cooperation with Uganda in countering the threat posed by the LRA has strengthened our bilateral relationship and improved the UPDF's ability to respond quickly and responsibly to regional threats. Along with health, education, and development assistance, the United States also funds and conducts a number of programs in Uganda designed to train and professionalize the Ugandan military and police, with a strong emphasis on human rights. Through its ongoing participation in AMISOM and counter-LRA operations, Uganda is poised to continue playing a critical role in regional stability in the future. However, Uganda's long-term global standing will, in large part, depend on its ability to match its growing military might with strong democratic institutions, good governance, and an expanding economy.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

In the DRC, the United States works to improve security and stability; support a political solution to the ongoing violence; strengthen governance institutions; and support economic recovery. Progress in each of these areas is critical to moving the country toward being a stable and democratic nation at peace with its neighbors and able to govern its territory and serve its citizens. As insecurity in eastern and northeastern DRC indicates, the DRC still has limited capabilities to control significant portions of the country's territory, or protect its population, which it must address. The country faces large challenges resulting from years of war and ongoing violence in the eastern provinces. Overcoming these challenges will take time, but immediate progress is required in order to save lives and set in motion broader improvements. The United States has a humanitarian interest in reducing suffering in the DRC and a broader security interest in helping the country contribute to regional economic prosperity rather than destabilizing the broader continent.

Improving security and stability will require strengthening and disciplining the DRC's security forces and neutralizing the threat of armed groups, as well as an immediate focus on the protection of civilians. The country's security forces are at the same time weak and a threat to the population, requiring that their discipline and accountability be strengthened at the same time that their capacity is bolstered. A U.N. peacekeeping force remains essential to all of these tasks in the near term. While other armed groups may be integrated into the national armed forces, the LRA clearly belongs in the category of those that will have to be dismantled more aggressively using a variety of pressures. At the same time, in the long term, more effective security forces and a more robust civilian government presence are required to sustainably reduce the opportunities and incentives for armed-group formation.

C. Priority actions in LRA-affected areas

The strategic objectives provide the overarching framework for achieving the end-state and the strategic outcomes. The actions below reflect some of the most significant issues requiring urgent and sustained action, many of which have implications for more than one strategic objective. As the United States Government prepares to implement the strategy, in the short-term the United States Government will work with partners to pursue and as appropriate refine the actions below.

Increase physical access and telecommunications

The United States Government will seek to accelerate and increase the physical access to and telecommunications in LRA-affected areas, particularly in the CAR and DRC. Specifically, improving the critical infrastructure in LRA-affected areas could include road and airstrip rehabilitation efforts in LRA-affected areas as well as support for telecommunications efforts in LRA-affected areas, pending the availability of resources. These actions will provide secondary benefits to these communities by better linking them to local and regional economies.

Increase mobility and access of civilian protection actors in LRA-affected areas

The limited mobility of regional partners in the LRA-affected areas remains of concern for humanitarian and civilian protection actors, including peacekeeping missions. The United States

will seek to work in concert with other donors to promote a range of options that would increase the mobility of partners.

Enhance coordination of civilian actors and sharing of information across borders

The United States Government will help support the coordination of civilian actors working at the local, national, and regional, as well as those needing to communicate across borders.

Enhance the coordination and collaboration of forces in LRA-affected areas

The United States Government will work with partners to accelerate and increase the gathering, analysis, synthesis, and sharing of all forms of information with multilateral and regional forces protecting civilians, helping to counter the LRA, and increase opportunities for defection and DDR. The varying mandates and capabilities of actors in the region involved in mitigating, responding to, or eliminating the LRA threat creates significant difficulty in effective coordination and collaboration. The United States Government will seek opportunities to ensure that, where and when possible, various efforts are mutually-reinforcing and coordinated..

Increase opportunities for LRA fighters and associated persons to safely defect and escape

The United States will seek to support efforts that seek to accelerate and increase opportunities for LRA fighters and associated persons, and abductees to safely defect and escape. While others have the lead in this area, the United States will seek to provide additional technical assistance and support as possible to these efforts.

D. U.S. Interagency Coordination

The strategy also seeks to leverage expertise and capabilities across the interagency. It provides the basis for the collaborative, integrated, and cross-cutting efforts of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the USAID, and the Intelligence Community, and any components thereof, throughout the implementation of the strategy. The National Security Staff will assist with coordinating the implementation of the strategy and its strategic objectives.

The Department of State will play a central role in the implementation of the overall strategy. One of the most critical roles will be leading the diplomatic engagement and international coordination necessary to advance and sustain many of the objectives described herein. In addition, the Department of State is responsible for reporting on the overall implementation of the LRA strategy. Consistent with Section 8 of Public Law 111-172, the Department of State shall prepare and submit to Congress a report on the progress made toward the implementation of the strategy within one year of the submission of the strategy (as detailed under section 4). All agencies will be responsible for providing all of the relevant analysis to the Department of State to fulfill this requirement.

VI. Conclusion

This strategy builds on lessons learned from previous United States Government efforts and incorporates all current and ongoing United States Government programs addressing the LRA

and the affected communities in DRC, the CAR, and Sudan. What is different about this strategy is that it provides an overarching, comprehensive strategic direction over several years to enhance these efforts and to increase the likelihood of success in mitigating and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA. Specifically, the strategy relies on simultaneously taking actions under four strategic objectives. While the strategy addresses the urgent challenges associated with the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior commanders, these efforts take place in the context of efforts to increase options for combatants, associated persons, and other abductees to safely leave the ranks of the LRA. While maintaining military and diplomatic pressure within the region on the LRA, such efforts to promote exit options through defections, escape and rescue remain a critical and urgent task. In tandem with the sustained pressure and enhanced exit options, the strategy seeks to reduce the vulnerabilities of civilian populations and to increase their access to humanitarian assistance where needed.

The strategy sets the strategic direction. The successful implementation of this strategy requires the appropriation of new resources. The challenges are enormous and without additional funding eliminating the LRA threat will remain elusive. Given the proven ability of the LRA to escape, evade, and regenerate, we must recognize that even with additional resources; it will prove extraordinarily difficult to eliminate this scourge. A key part of this strategy is to encourage other partners to expand their own efforts against the LRA and for the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian assistance. The United States will work to identify the necessary resources and as well as seek to increase the participation of other partners and donors.

VII. Annexes

- A. Public Law 111–172 (May 24, 2010): Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009
- B. Comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda
- C. Acronyms

A. Public Law 111–172 (May 24, 2010): Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009
[INSERT]

B. Comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda

Public Law 111-172 reiterates the importance of “Assistance for Recovery and Reconstruction in Northern Uganda” and “Assistance for Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda.” This annex provides a preliminary description of efforts in these areas in preparation for reporting in more detail, consistent with the reporting requirements in the law. Congressional interest in northern Uganda has been reflected in several legislative actions.

Further supporting efforts of the Government of Uganda and civil society to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda as affirmed in the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–283) and subsequent resolutions, including Senate Resolution 366, 109th Congress, agreed to February 2, 2006, Senate Resolution 573, 109th Congress, agreed to September 19, 2006, Senate Concurrent Resolution 16, 110th Congress, agreed to in the Senate March 1, 2007, and House Concurrent Resolution 80, 110th Congress, agreed to in the House of Representatives June 18, 2007.

Overview

As stated in the “Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament (LRA) and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009” (Public Law 111-172) and in the President’s strategy, it is the policy of the United States to work with regional governments toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and other war-affected areas. USAID, in coordination with the Department of State and other United States Government agencies, supports Uganda in pursuing a stable and productive northern region that will contribute to Uganda’s larger peace and development aims. While the LRA no longer has any real political agenda or grievances associated with northern Uganda, any comprehensive resolution to the broader conflict that engulfed northern Uganda and the previous economic marginalization of the area requires the economic viability of the north as well as the effective reintegration of displaced populations, including the integration of former LRA combatants.

The LRA-affected part of northern Uganda is dramatically different today than it was in 2003 when former U.N. Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland dubbed it “the world’s worst forgotten humanitarian crisis.” In 2006, LRA leader Joseph Kony and his senior commanders were successfully pushed from northern Uganda to build camps, stockpile food and other supplies, abduct more recruits and terrorize communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and southern Sudan. In this environment, the significant majority of formerly internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in northern Uganda have returned to or near their homes due to improved security, and United States Government programs have transitioned to reconciliation, recovery, and development efforts.

A recent USAID-funded survey found that 85 percent of northern Ugandans believe that the region is currently at peace, but less than half (44 percent) believe that the peace will hold. Forty-five percent of those surveyed fear that the LRA will return. USAID’s current programs, which take a holistic view of the situation in northern Uganda, are designed to promote reconciliation and recovery in war-affected areas, and to build the confidence of northern

Ugandans that peace and security are here to stay. Programs to date have focused on the following:

- Building the capacity of local governance institutions in northern Uganda to deliver basic goods and services;
- Supporting programs for ex-combatants and formerly displaced persons to reintegrate into their home communities;
- Providing improved access to health and education services;
- Supporting livelihoods and economic development within the region; and
- Developing communication strategies to facilitate reconciliation.

USAID efforts in fiscal year FY 2010 through FY 2012 will focus on supporting the Government of Uganda's (GOU's) 3-year (2009/10 to 2012/13), \$600 million Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP), which serves as the key policy framework that guides reconciliation and recovery for northern Uganda. Designed with the goal of transitioning northern Uganda from relying on humanitarian assistance to being an economically viable and self-sustaining region of the country, the PRDP aims to strengthen government institutions, rebuild and empower communities, revitalize the economy, and support peacebuilding and reconciliation. It was noted in the PRDP Monitoring Committee meeting in June 2010 that the PRDP is designed to close the gap between northern Uganda and the rest of the country.¹

The PRDP Monitoring Committee confirmed that the GOU provided all funds pledged for its budget year 2009/10 and that the GOU would be committing an additional 100 billion Uganda shillings (\$44.4 million) to the PRDP in its 2010/11 budget. Uganda's development partners, including the United States Government, have allocated an additional \$151.6 million (340 billion Uganda shillings) to activities that fall within the PRDP priority sectors and support the Government of Uganda's PRDP efforts for the same period. However, even with this support, staffing levels are inadequate and the ability of local and regional government officials in northern Uganda to implement key provisions within the PRDP remains weak.

Efforts to Date

In FY 2009, the United States Government provided \$165 million to northern Uganda, and in FY 2010, the United States Government provided \$168 million to support programming in health, education, water and sanitation, peace and reconciliation, and infrastructure projects to help the GOU implement the PRDP. Some of USAID's programs include:

- **Reconciliation and Recovery Programming:** USAID's Strengthening Democratic Linkages in Uganda (LINKAGES) is a \$7 million program that promotes policy dialogue among the civil society, local governments and the national parliament in an effort to address post-conflict reconciliation and recovery in northern Uganda. Six districts targeted by LINKAGES are within the PRDP focus areas.

¹ Statement by the Local Development Partner Group (LDPG) at the Third PRDP Monitoring Committee Meeting in Kampala (June 28, 2010). Please see <http://www.prdp.org.ug/> for additional information.

In February 2008, USAID funded a \$9.5 million 3-year program focused on Stability, Peace, and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda (SPRING). The SPRING program aims to address the causes and consequences of the conflict in northern Uganda by implementing activities in three core areas: (1) peacebuilding and reconciliation; (2) community-based economic security and social inclusion; and (3) access to justice. The SPRING program collaborates closely with local authorities, civil society and private sector actors to support the stabilization and recovery of areas most affected by the LRA conflict.

Additionally, in FY 2009 and FY 2010, USAID funded a \$1.8 million program to address key causes of conflict and engage communities to achieve lasting peace and reconciliation in the Karamoja region. While the Karamoja region has generally not been affected by the LRA, there is a history of antagonism between communities in the LRA-affected areas and communities in Karamoja. Cattle raiding among pastoralist groups, small arms trade, and weak state institutions are among the drivers of conflict in this region. USAID's Karamoja program is designed to strengthen local and district mechanisms for conflict mitigation, response, and reconciliation; foster peace and reconciliation in target sites through ongoing government and civil society dialogues and joint monitoring; and provide livelihood opportunities to address key causes of conflict in target areas.

- **Building Government Capacity:** USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched a program in June 2008, known as the Northern Uganda Transition Initiative (NUTI), to promote peace, recovery, and development in the region and support the voluntary return of displaced citizens in northern Uganda. To assist these efforts, NUTI focuses on the following objectives: (1) increasing the visibility of and confidence in all levels of government through the delivery of targeted, strategic interventions; (2) increasing access to information on peace, recovery and development issues through strategic communications activities and support to the media; and (3) providing support to transitional justice processes. From FY 2008 to FY 2010, this \$21.8 million program resulted in a total allocation of more than 200 grants to local government and community-based organizations, benefitting more than 150,000 people. USAID's OTI and Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) also helped the GOU establish war crimes legislation and a special division within the Ugandan High Court, the War Crimes Division, to try senior LRA commanders for violations of international humanitarian law. As the 2011 national and local elections approach and as NUTI enters its last year of full programming, OTI is refocusing some of its activities to address voter education, voter registration, and election support, as well as the areas of vulnerable youth, capacity building, and conflict prevention.
- **Supporting Rule of Law:** In FY 2009, the United States Government provided \$6.3 million in Department of Defense Section 1207 funding for a Community Justice Project that seeks to reestablish rule of law and security in northern Uganda. The program, which is being implemented through Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and USAID/OTI, supports community policing activities and efforts to construct, equip, and furnish four community justice centers in selected northern Uganda districts. Community justice-oriented facilities rehabilitated by USAID through the Community Justice Project include three police stations, a prosecutor's office, four court

houses, an office for the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and staff housing for police, DPP officials and magistrates.

- **Economic Development and Recovery:** The Northern Uganda Development of Enhanced Local Governance, Infrastructure, and Livelihoods (NUDEIL) program aims to stimulate the economy and create sustainable peace in northern Uganda by increasing government services and generating income-producing opportunities to populations in areas of high return from internally displaced person (IDP) camps. The program also works to build the foundation for longer-term development in target districts. The NUDEIL program's 3-year implementation period commenced in 2009 in Gulu, Amuru, Oyam, and Kitgum districts with \$37 million in funding, of which \$30 million is provided to the GOU through non-project assistance and \$7 million funds a USAID-managed support contractor. The NUDEIL program provides technical support to district governments in the areas of engineering, financial management, and public outreach along with small infrastructure activities that the districts implement.
- **Media and Strategic Communication:** USAID supports two projects focused on the media and the role it plays in supporting reconciliation. The first project provided integrated training and technical support to ten independent community radio stations in northern Uganda. The program built the capacity of local broadcasters to report on and facilitate regional dialogues on peace, justice and reconciliation. Additionally, USAID works directly with radio stations to help disseminate correct and timely information to citizens in northern Uganda on issues such as development initiatives being undertaken by the GOU. These broadcasts help mitigate rumors and change perceptions of the GOU.

Key Issues to Inform United States Government Engagement

United States Government programs previously focused on conflict resolution and LRA conflict-related humanitarian assistance, such as Special Objective for Reintegration of Northern Uganda (RENU; 1999-2001), Community Resilience and Dialogue (2002-2007), and Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI; 2004-2007), have transitioned to providing long-term development assistance. USAID and other relevant United States Government agencies intend to align future support with the Government of Uganda's PRDP priorities in the north. U.S. programs, amounting to \$165 million in FY 2009 and \$168 million in FY 2010, fall within the PRDP priority sectors and support the GOU's efforts. Such efforts by the GOU should be conducted with transparency and accountability with the goal of reversing perceptions that the GOU is not concerned about restoration of LRA-affected areas. The primary long-term focus of the PRDP includes:

- Strengthening peace and security;
- Improving service delivery at the local level;
- Creating and enabling greater private sector engagement;
- Improving transport infrastructure; and
- Monitoring the PRDP to ensure accountability and results.

Accountability

The slow start of the PRDP has created public skepticism as to whether the Government of Uganda is serious about implementing all of the proposed initiatives in the plan. If this skepticism persists, the United States Government could provide assistance to the Office of the Prime Minister and officials at the local level to manage and coordinate the programs under the framework of the PRDP, while helping to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that conveys timely information about particular projects. Such information would promote transparency and accountability and would defuse long-standing political grievances that could otherwise fuel new conflicts in the region. By taking meaningful steps toward national reconciliation, developing oversight mechanisms, and establishing reporting requirements at both the local and national level, the Government of Uganda will solidify greater buy-in for its programs in the north.

Potential Flashpoints of Violence

USAID's CMM and the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) recently completed an Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) report. The ICAF revealed that land disputes remain a source of deep grievances and at times result in violence. For most Ugandans, land is their most valuable asset, yet the system to secure ownership is dysfunctional. This is primarily due to the government's inability to make operational land tenure laws, and weak mechanisms to effectively manage competing interests and priorities with regard to land. Although the land tenure laws on the books are sound, there is presently very little capacity within the government to implement these laws. Limited capacity and corruption have led to public distrust of government institutions' ability to manage land dispute claims. Local structures are mediating some of the conflicts, but more support is needed. As appropriate, the United States Government can assist in developing programs that support capacity building and foster greater accountability of government officials to resolve land tenure disputes.

National Accountability and Reconciliation Mechanisms

The Annexure on Accountability and Reconciliation of the Juba Peace Agreement stipulates three key areas of transitional justice meant to bridge the provisions for accountability with nationwide reconciliation as outlined in the Agreement. Specifically, the Annexure calls for the establishment of the War Crimes Division, a special division of the High Court of Uganda to try individuals alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict (referenced above), the creation of a national reconciliation and truth-telling body, and the incorporation of traditional justice mechanisms into both local and national truth-telling mechanisms. The Government of Uganda has committed to implementing these three components in its attempt to end the two-decade long conflict with the LRA. While United States Government support to the ICC cases against LRA leaders is critical, national judicial systems will have to prosecute remaining senior LRA leaders responsible for violations of international humanitarian law. In response to this gap, the GOU has worked to establish a War Crimes Division of the High Court to try senior LRA commanders and others who may be accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, the War Crimes Division is currently working on its first case and additional support is needed to train and assist investigators and prosecutors. In addition, little attention has been given to establishing a national reconciliation and truth-telling body or designing a process for

incorporating traditional justice mechanisms into both local and national truth-telling mechanisms. Furthermore, the Annex calls for the creation of a system for making reparations to victims of the LRA conflict.

Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The main challenge facing continued peace and security in the north is ensuring that recovery and development keep pace with IDP returns and expectations. More than 90 percent of former IDPs have returned to their homes or their communities due to improved security in the region. Many of the IDPs spent their entire lives in camps with services provided to them by humanitarian agencies, so their expectations, along with their health and education levels, will likely fall due to infrastructure conditions being weak and local government capacity being low.

C. Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
CAR	Central African Republic
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
FARDC	Armed Forces of Democratic Republic of Congo
GOU	Government of Uganda
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally-Displaced Person
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MINURCAT	U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONSUCO	U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NUDEIL	Northern Uganda Development of Enhanced Local Governance, Infrastructure, and Livelihoods
NUPI	Northern Uganda Peace Initiative
NUTI	Northern Uganda Transition Initiative
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRDP	Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan
Public Law 111-172	Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPRING	Stability, Peace, and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development